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CoRPORATIONs-SHAREHOLDERs' DERIVATIVE SmTs-WHEN DEMAND ON SHAREHOLDERS IS A PREREQUISITE TO MAINTENANCE OF

Surr-A shareholder's derivative s11it is an equity proceeding instituted
by a shareholder on behalf of himself and all other shareholders to
assert corporate rights.1 Both the corporation and the parties allegedly
liable to the corporation are necessary parties.2 The question to be considered in this comment.is, when must the plaintiff shareholder show
that he sought redress for the corporation through collective action of
the shareholders and failed to secure it? As a preliminary matter, we may
ask what sort of collective action the shareholders are expected to take.
A few authorities suggest that the shareholders, as a body, bring suit
against the directors where misconduct by the directorate is alleged;3
but such a suit would also be derivative, and its advantages over the
ordinary derivative suit are not apparent. The common suggestion is
that the shareholders will act in a meeting and either adopt a resolution
directing the management to bring suit or elect a new management
pledged to do so.4
1 Glenn, "The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate and Individual Grievances," 33 YALE L.J.
580 at 580-81 (1924).
2 13 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., §§5944, 5953 (1943).
3 Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 30 S.W. (2d) 976 (1930) contains such a suggestion. 72 A.L.R. 628 (1931), annotating the above case, states, "The cases are uniform
in holding that there must be a request that the stockholders as a body sue the directors, or
that an action be brought for their benefit, before an individual shareholder may bring an
action in the interest of the corporation,-unless such a request would be useless and unavailing." The vast majority of the cases cited have been examined, but no further recognition of
the suggestion was discovered.
4Tuscaloosa Mfg. Co. v. Cox, 68 Ala. 71 (1880); Miller v. Murray, 17 Colo. 408, 30
P. 46 (1892); Alexander v. Searcy, 81 Ga. 536, 8 S.E. 630 (1888); Dunphy v. Traveller
Newspaper Assn., 146 Mass. 495, 16 N.E. 426 (1888); Wolf v. Penn. Ry. Co., 195 Pa. St.
91, 45 A. 936 (1900).
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A. The Problem in Perspective
-

The problem under discussion is created by an apparent clash between two policies of the law. The first is a judicial reluctance to interfere with internal corporate affairs. This attitude may be derived from
the time-honored equity approach to partnership accounting petitions
which generally refuses to undertake art accounting between partners
withou~ dissolving the firm, on the theory that partners must solve internal disputes to be successful.5 In any event__, a corporate directorate is
given a rather wide managerial discretion and its decisions on internal
policy enjoy a judicial presumption of validity. 6 Hence the courts
say in countless derivative suits that the plaintiff must show that he has
exhausted his remedies within the corporation, and, to that end, must
- either show a wrongful refusal by the corporate management to cause
the corporation to sue, or establish that such demand would be futile. 7
When one reB.ects that there will almost always be a dissenting minority
of shareholders who disapprove of managerial decisions and considers
the need for rapid and authoritative decisions in the present-day business world, such an approach clearly makes sense. The principal argument for requiring an appeal to majority shareholders is that this too
is part of the process of handling· corporate affairs within the corporation. 8 Other factors ·casting doubt on the desirability of derivative suits
are judicial experience that counsel may induce such suits to collect
fees, which the corporation usually pays,9 and that, in the federal courts,
corporations themselves employ the derivative suit as a means of invoking diversity jurisdiction in suits which the management really
wishes to bring.10 Such abuses, of course, encourage restrictions on the
derivative suit remedy. The second general policy is to give an effective
remedy to shareholders whose interests are being jeopardized by the
activities of an unscrupulous management or strangers whom the management refuses to sue. These are precisely the situations which called
the derivative suit into being, and it would hardly be argued that such
a remedy is unnecessary; however, the protective screen built by the law to protect honest_management from being harassed acts in these cases
5Lord v. Hull, 178 N.Y. 9, 70 N.E. 69 (1904) •
.6 5 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., §2104 (1943).
713 FLETCHER, CYc:CoRP., perm. ed., §5945 (1943).
s Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 at 460-61, 26 L. ed. 827 (1881).
9 "Survey and Report regarding Stockholders' Derivative Suits" at p. 11, SPECIAL CoMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LincATION, N.Y. STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (1944).
10 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 26 L. ed. 827' (1881).
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as a cloak for the wrongdoer, leaving the wronged shareholder confronted by a legat obstacle course.11
It is suggested that the question before us· should be approached
with the above policies in view, and that a derivative suit plaintiff
should be required to appeal to shareholders before obtaining judicial
redress for the corporation only if the value of such an appeal in encouraging the settlement of corporate problems within the business outweighs the inconvenience thus imposed on the plaintiff. It should also
be remembered that, whatever solution is reached, it should be as
definite as possible. The less the clarity of the law, the more numerous
will be the cases in which the expense and delay of a demand on shareholders is needlessly incurred, or the expense and delay of discovering
that such a demand should have been made is suffered.
B.

The Authorities Examined

To our question-when must the plaintiff show an unsuccessful attempt to obtain redress through shareholders in order to maintain a
derivative suit-the cases give several answers. First, some courts have
stated categorically that no_ demand on shareholders is necessary;12
these cases appear to rule as a matter of law that the directorate is created to decide whether the corporation should sue, while the shareholders' meeting is not. Where the corporation is a large one and shares
are diversely held, a shareholders' meeting is really an assembly of the
management's proxy committee, and if the management has already
refused to bring suit, their employees will hardly take a different stand.
Should plaintiff attempt to present his case to a diverse group of shareholders before the meeting and thus obtain their proxies himself, he
11 See the detailed requirements of Federal Rule 23(b), 28 U.S.C., §723 (1941). A
plaintiff must present a complaint which: (1) is verilied by oath; (2) avers that plaintiff
owned his shares when the wrong to the corporation took place, or that they have since devolved upon him by operation of law; (3) avers that the action is not a collusive one to confer
diversity jurisdiction; ( 4) states specifically the steps taken to obtain action by management
and shareholders if necessary. This is the rule of Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 26 L. ed.
827 (1881) in codified form: Quincyv. Steel, 120 U.S. 241 at 245-49, 7 S.Ct. 520 (1887);
Wathen v. Jackson Oil & Refining Co., 235 U.S. 635 .at 639-40, 35 S.Ct. 225 (1914). The
latter case traces the codification to Equity Rule 27, and the exact language of Equity Rule
27 is repeated in Rule 23 (b).
.
12 Reed v. Hollingsworth, 157 Iowa 94 at 106, 135 N.W. 37 (1912); Hazard v. Durant,
11 R.I. 195 at 202-03 (1877); Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304 at 315-16,
144 S. 674 (1932), [the opinion on re-hearing, 119 Fla. 159 at 168-69, 161 S. 284 (1935)
is more conservative, however, pointing out that the defendants were majority shareholders
which would have made an appeal to shareholders idle].
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would be involved in a project requiring substantial effort and expense.
These considerations support the view that an appeal to shareholders
should not be required. Query, however, whether such a doctrine is
sustainable where the corporation is owned by a small number of share- holders who have an active interest in its affairs. The courts taking
the above view apparently have not dealt with such cases, but the matter seems arguable. It is probably true that a demand for suit by the
corporation could be made on a compact group of shareholders with
little difficulty; but on the other hand, the fewer and the more active
in corporate affairs the shareholders are, the more likely it is that the
management which has refused to sue will reHect their views. In
terms of the policy considerations discussed previously, these courts have
apparently concluded that the desir:able end of settling corporate grievances within the corporation is not served substantially by requiring
an appeal to shareholders after th_e management has refused- to sue.
A second rule has been adopted by the bulk of the American cases,
following, either expressly or in fact, the language of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Hawes v. Oakland: 13 " • • • it is ...
important that before the shareholder is permitted in his own name
to institute and conduct a litigation which usually belongs to the corporation, he should show to the satisfaction of the court that he has
exhausted all the means within his reach to obtain, within the corporation itself, the redress of his grievances. . . . If time permits . . . he
must show, if he fails with the directors, that he has made an honest
effort tp obtain action by the shareholders as a body, in the matter of
which he complains. And he must show a case, if this is not done,
13104 U.S. 450, 26 L. ed. 827 (1881). These cases specifically endorse Hawes v. Oakland: Miller v. Murray, 17 Colo. 408, 30 P. 46 (1892); Alexander v. Searcy, 81 Ga. 536, 8
, S.E. 630 (1888); Stedtfeld v. Eddy, 45 Idaho 584, 264 P. 381 (1928); Latimer v. Richmond
R.R. Co., 39 S.C. 44, 17 S.E. 258 (1892); Allen v. Montana Refining Co., 71 Mont. 105,
227 P. 582 (1924); Ulmer v. Maine Real Estate Co., 93 Maine 324, 45 A. 40 (1899); Albers
v. Merchants' Exchange, 45 Mo. App. 206 (1891); North v. Union Savings & Loan Assn.,
59 Ore. 483, 117 P. 822 (1911); New Birmingham Iron & Land Co. v. Blevens, 12 Tex.
Civ. App. 410, 34 S.W. 828 (1896); Elliott v. Puget Sound Wood Products Co., 52 Wash.
637, 101 P. 228 (1909); Rathbone v. Gas Co., 31 W.Va. 798, 8 S.E. 570 (1888); McCampbell v-. Fountain Head Ry. Co., 111 Tenn. 55, 77 S.W. 1070 (1903). Less satisfactory support for the Hawes case is found in the following cases: Iron Hall v. Baker, 134 Ind. 293, 33
N.E. 1128 (1892); Merrimon v. Southern Paving & Construction Co., 142 N.C. 539, 55
S.E. 366 (1906); Fomaseri v. Cosmosart Realty & Bldg. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 549, 274 P.
597 (1929); Wolf v. Penna. R.R. Co., 195 Pa. St: 91, 45 A. 936 (1900). A doctrine
similar to the Hawes rule is stated in these cases: Tuscaloosa Mfg. Co. v. Cox, 68 Ala.
71 (1880); Beckett v. Planters' Warehouse Co., 107 Miss. 305, 65 S. 275 (1914); Va.
Passenger & Power Co. v. Fisher, 104 Va. 121, 51 S.E. 198 (1905) ..
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where it could not be done, or it was not reasonable to require it.:,14
By this view, demand on shareholders is required with three exceptions: where time does not permit it; where an appeal to shareholders
cannot be made; and where it would be unreasonable to require such
an appeal. The first exception refers to cases where the delay incident
to seeking action by shareholders would :,;ender a final judgment for
plaintiff an ineffectual remedy.15 It is not clear what is meant by the
exception that application to shareholders is excused where it "could
not be" made. If this language refers to a case of impossibility in fact,
no examples thereof have been discovered. A possible example would
be a case where the corporate records have been lost or destroyed and
it is not known who the sharep.olders are.16 If something less than
strict impossibility is referred to, this exception would seem to blend
imperceptibly into the third, namely, that demand on shareholders is
not necessary where it is unreasonable to require it. The cases do not
indicate clearly the situations which fall within the third exception. It
is generally accepted that no demand is necessary where the wrongdoers
whom plaintiff wishes to sue are majority shareholders;17 presumably
the same would be true where the directorate which refuses to sue comprises the majority shareholders. Some of the cases requiring an appeal
to shareholders have involved rather s~all corporations with few shareholders, though the opinions do not always stress this fact. 18 In the
federal courts, no demand is required if the current management controls a substantial block of shares and the remaining shares are diversely
held making an extensive proxy fight necessary.19 There is authority
both ways on the question of whether mere diversity of share ownership excuses demand. 20
14 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 at 460-61,
15 Passmore v. Allentown & Reading Traction Co.,

26 L. ed. 827 (1881).
267 Pa. St. 356, 110 A. 240 (1920)

is such a case.
16 Hiller v. Calmac Oil &Gas Corp., 258 App. Div. 78, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 531 (1940)
involves substantially these facts but New York does not follow the Hawes case.
17 Allen v. Montana Refining Co., 71 Mont. 105 at 122-23, 227 P. 582 (1924);
North v. Union Savings & Loan Assn., 59 Ore. 483, 117 P. 822 (1911); Moore v. L.&R.
Electric Ry. Co., 80 W.Va. 653, 93 S.E. 762 (1917); McCampbell v. Fountain Head
Ry. Co., 111 Tenn. 55 at 68-69, 77 S.W. 1070 (1903); Beckett v. Planters' Warehouse
Co., 107 Miss. 305, 65 S. 275 (1914).
1 8 One which does not is Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 30 S.W. (2d)
976 (1930); for one which does see Miller v. Murray, 17 Colo. 408, 30 P. 46 (1892).
1 9Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & Susquehanna Ry. Co., 213 U.S. 435 at 452,
29 S.Ct. 540 (1909).
.
20 To the effect that it does: Berg v. Cincinnati, Newport & Covington Ry. Co., (D.C.
Ky. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 842 at 845; Citrin v. Greater N.Y. Industries, Inc., (D.C. N.Y.
1948) 79 F. Supp. 692. To the effect that it does not: Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas
Pipeline Co., (D.C. Del. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 334 (dictum); Bruce & Co. v. Bothwell,
(D.C. N.Y. 1948) 8 F. Rules Dec. 45 at 47.
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There will thus be many marginal cases in which plaintiff, to be
safe, must present his complaints to a shareholders' meeting if he sues
in a court following the Hawes case. No statistics have been found on
the number of cases in which this procedure has resulted in redress
within the corporation. Substantial authority suggests that a shareholders' meeting is no place for dealing with such problems, because they
are too involved for effective presentation at such a time. 21 The com-_
plexity of the proceedings in many derivative suits lends credence to
· this view. It is also significant that neither the Hawes opinion nor subsequent cases guided by it have dealt extensively with these questions;
it seems to be assumed without analysis that the shareholders are a
proper body to decide whether the corporation should sue. On the
other hand, the Hawes case does stress the extent to which derivative
~mits have been abused in order to obtain diversity jurisdiction. It has
been suggested that this fact, pertinent only in the federal courts, renders the Hawes doctrine a questionable rule for the states to adopt. 22
In the light of Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 23 the question must be
asked, is the Hawes doctrine a rule of substantive law or a rule of procedure? If the former, it cannot be applied if the governing state law
takes a different view. There is no clear answer in the cases. 24
The New York Court of Appe;ls, in the case of Continental Securities Company v. Belmont,25 has stated a third rule, namely, that an
appeal to shareholders is necessary only where (1) the injury to the
corporation is one which the majority of the shareholders have the
power to ratify, or (2) where for any reason the majority are in a position to cause the corporation to take prompt action. This is the doctrine
of the English cases, ~d is favored by American text writers and a few
21 Slutzker v. Rieber, 132 N.J.Eq. 406 at 410-11, 28 A. (2d) 525 (1942); Mason
v. Harris, 11 Ch.Div. 97 (1879); CooK, STOCK .AND STOCKHOLDERS, 3rd ed., §740 (1894).
22 Baker v. Bankers Mortgage Co., 14 Del. Ch. 427 at 430-31, 129 A. 775 (1925).
23 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938) which held that federal courts in diversity
cases must apply the substantive law of the states in which they sit.
24 Venner v. Great Northern Ry., 209 U.S. 24 at 34, 28 S.Ct. 328 (1907) says
that the rule of Hawes v. Oakland is a rule of equity as distinguished from a jurisdictional
rule, and implies that it is a rule of substantive law; the federal courts seem to have treated
state law as controlling in the following cases: Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line
Co., (D.C. Del. 1944). 41 F. Supp. 334; Craftsman Finance & Mortgage Co. v. Brown,
(D.C. N.Y. 1945) 64 F. Supp. 168. Contra, 13 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., penn. ed., §5943
(1943).
25 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
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decisions. 26 It clearly seems sensible to require plaintiff to ·present his
case to a shareholders' meeting if shareholder ratification could extinguish the corporation's cause of action altogether. Otherwise, plaintiff's suit might be rendered futile by ratification pendente lite, or problems of res judicata might arise if a decree in favor of the corporation
were entered before ratification took place.27 Where the wrong to the
corporation is such that it cannot be ratified over the dissent of a single
shareholder, the Belmont case suggests that effective action by shareholders is unlikely. 28 There is, however, a strong suggestion in a recent
case that action by shareholders might be required if plaintiffs themselves controlled a majority of the shares and no special circumstances
existed making the calling of a shareholders' meeting difficult. 29 Thus
far, this dictum seems to be the sole application of the second branch
of the Belmont doctrine. 30 Hence, unless the plaintiffs are majority
shareholders, it seems that they need only apply to shareholders if the
claim which they seek to enforce could be extinguished by ratification.

C.

Conclusions

If, as suggested above, the basis for requiring plaintiff to seek
redress through a,shareholders' meeting is to encourage settlement of
corporate problems within the corporation, the reason for the rule obtains in relatively few cases. The body equipped to decide whether the
corporation should sue or not is the directorate. The complexity of the
question, the mechanical difficulties of actually reaching the shareholders in a shareholders' meeting, the expense to the plaintiff, and the
delay involved all suggest that ~ appeal to shareholders is an inconvenient and unsatisfactory method of causing the corporation to sue.
If the shareholders may ratify and extinguish the corporation's claim,
26 Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843); Fisher v. National
Mortgage Loan Co., 132 Neb. 185 at 198, 271 N.W. 433 (1937); a dissenting opinion
by Stone, J. in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 at 143-44, 53 S.Ct. 295
(1932) argues that demand on shareholders is not necessary in that case since ratification
would not be possible, citing the Belmont case; STEVENS, PRIVATE CoRPORATIONs, §164
(1936); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, §146 (1946); 4 CooK, CORPORATIONS, 8th ed.,
§740 (1923); 51 L.R.A.(n.s.) 112 (1914).
27 Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843) argues that a subsequent
ratification by majority shareholders could extinguish a decree previously rendered in
favor of the corporation in a derivative suit.
2s 206 N.Y. 7 at 16-17, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
29 Hiller v. Calmac Oil & Gas Corp., 258 App. Div. (N.Y.) 78 at 86-87, IO N.Y.8.
(2d) 531 (1940).
SO Hayman v. Brown, 176 Misc. 176, 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 898 (1941) might be thought
to deal with this problem but it is distinguishable since plaintiff was asserting a right
personal to him rather than one in favor of the corporation.
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it makes seiise to :find out before suing whether they will elect to do so
or not, and that is the position of the Belmont case. Some authority
suggests that courts following Hawes v. Oakland would require an
appeal to shareholders in this situation,31 and nothing in the language
of that case suggests the contrary. Those jurisdictions holding that demand cm shareholders is never necessary apparently have not considered
cases where ratification by shareholders would extinguish the claim.
Should the courts go further and require an appeal to shareholders
in some situations where ratification is impossible? It seems likely that
such a course would be both effective and no great inconvenience to the
plaintiff if majority shareholders are few in number, habitually attend
shareholders' meetings, are not in collusion with the principal defendant,
and if a shareholders' meeting could be held promptly. Perhaps such situations are uncommon but, if they did arise, a court following the
Belmont case might well hold that majority shareholders could give
prompt relief and should be consulted. 32 It is suggested that an appeal
to shareholders should not be required in other situations even in the
federal courts. The problem of the collusive suit to confer jurisdiction
is dealt with elsewhere in the federal practice,33 while counsel who
abuse the derivative suit remedy should logically be dealt with through
the law of maintenance.
Finally, we may ask whether the position suggested above offers a
definite rule for the plaintiff's guidance. The approach propb,sed where
ratification is not possible seems to be satisfactory, but it is not always
easy to decide whether a corporate cause of action can be extinguished
by ratification before the management has defended its refusal to sue.34
Rather than forcing plaintiff to make this decision at his peril, it might
51 L.R.A.(n.s.) 112 (1914).
.
same should be true of closely analogous situations; for example, suppose
a case in which there was no directorate but the shareholders ran the corporation themselves, or a case where plaintiffs themselves were majority shareholders and a meeting
could be held promptly. Miller v. Murray, 17 Colo. 408, 30 P. 46 (1892) may have
presented the latter facts.
_ 33 See note 11~ supra.
34 As to when ratification is possible, see the following: Continental Securities Co. v.
Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7 ·at 18, 99 N.E. 138 (1912); Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng.
Rep. 189 (1843); Pollitz v. Wabash Ry. Co., 207 N.Y. 113 at 126-28, 100 N.E. 721
(1912); Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del: Ch. 234 at 245, 2 A. (2d) 904 (1938); Slutzker
v. Rieber, 132 N.J.Eq. 406, 28 A. (2d) 525 (1942); Endicott v. Marvel, 81 N.J.Eq. 378
at 383-84, 87 A. 230 (1913).
31

32 The
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be best to require defendants to plead possible ratification as a defense.
If the court believed the contention sound, a continuance could be granted to allow management to present the issue to the shareholders
via the usual proxy forms. 85
It is believed that the foregoing rules would adequately serve both
the policy of encouraging internal settlement of corporate problems and
that of allowing a plaintiff with a meritorious claim on behalf of his
corporation to litigate it with dispatch.

Thomas L. Waterbury, S.Ed.

35 Managements have done so in the past, Slutzker v. Rieber, 132 N.J.Eq. 406, 28
A. (2d) 525 (1942); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hodge, 64 N.J.Eq. 807, 54 A. I (1902).

